Innovative Synergies

Engineering Dimensionally Alternative Business Analysis 

Submissions to the Australian Government

Focus

Synopsis

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New South Wales Freight and Ports Strategy (2012)

The NSW Freight and Ports Strategy Plan (November 2012) is very biased towards maximally utilising Road Freight for all the wrong reasons.  

This submission steps up to envision an innovative economic picture that synergetically utilises an open approach at maximising the energy efficiency of transporting freight while minimising transit times and minimising the importation of diesel fuel.  

By using Vilfredo Parito's 80/20 Principle on the NSW Freight and Ports Draft Strategy 2012, this is what I immediately see:

  • NSW Road Freight highways are in good repair (20), but are extremely expensive to maintain (80)

  • NSW Rail Freight highways are in  gross neglect (80), but can be maintained rather inexpensively (20). 

  • The large majority NSW funding is for Road infrastructure (80) and negligible funding is for Rail infrastructure (20).

  • The overhead of Road Freight infrastructure is far more expensive (80) than the equivalent Rail Freight infrastructure (20).

  • Shipping - Rail Ports (80) are far more efficient (faster) than Shipping - Road Ports (20). 

Economically, it is budgetary and financial suicide to for NSW continue maintaining and building Main Roads, widening Motorways for Road Freight vehicles that interface with Shipping Ports and Intermodal Terminals.

By connecting Port Botany with an efficient (fast) Rail Freight link (20) , then most of Sydney's southern side (M5, M5 Tunnel,  Hume Highway) Road Freight congestion would be totally eliminated (80). 

By constructing a (fast) North - South Freight Rail Bypass in the Sydney Basin (20), then most of NSW interstate Road Freight would move to Rail Freight, making the roads considerably safer and dramatically reducing the NSW Roads budget (80) 

By constructing a (fast) Freight Rail link from Clyburn to Rosehill, (Page 37) linking to the North - South Freight Rail Bypass (20), then most of Sydney's North and West Road Freight (M7, M2, Pacific Highway, M5) would be minimised (80). 

  • Over an comparative distance, constructing a quick dual Rail track (20) would cost far less than an equivalent Road highway (80). 

  • Transport of Road Freight diesel fuel usage is far greater (80) than the equivalent Rail Freight diesel fuel usage (20).

  • Well maintained and well engineered Rail Freight can travel at 250 km/h (80), Road Freight is limited to 100 km/h (20).

  • With direct Freight Transport comparison Road damage (80), is far greater than Rail damage (20)

With the development of Rail Freight technology (20), the transport of Freight for distances greater than say 50 km is faster and greener (80).  

Road Freight is far more efficient (80) for transfer between Intermodal Terminals and Factories / Warehouses and Shops than Rail Freight (20).  

Rail Freight is far more efficient (80) for transfer between Intermodal Terminals and Ports than Road Freight (20). 

To minimise Road congestion (80), Intermodal Terminals must be re-located outside urban areas (20).

  • The intermodal Terminal at Cooks River (80) needs to be inexpensively repositioned to near Menangle Park (20).

  • The major Intermodal Terminal location for the South-west of NSW (80) should be near Goulburn (80).

  • With Fast Rail Freight infrastructure (20), Sydney's second Freight (and Passenger) Port should be near Goulburn (80). 

  • All Mines should have their Diesel Fuel transported as Rail Freight (80) from the Ports instead of by Road Freight (20)

  • Port Kembla (20) should be Fast Freight Rail linked with the Intermodal Terminal near Goulburn (80). 

This submission did not cover the West or North, nor the North-West of NSW, but it was very clear to me that over several decades, the NSW Rail Freight infrastructure has been "let go" (20).  Horrendously expensive Road Freight has replaced (80), what is really low maintenance, low overhead and efficient Freight Transport Infrastructure between all Intermodal Terminals and all Ports.  

Road Freight vehicles must not transfer Freight to/from Ports, nor between Intermodal Terminals.

 

Sydney's Northern Rail Corridor to the Hawkesbury River (2012)

As a follow-on from the NSW Draft Master Transport Long Term Plan 2012, an earlier submission by me realised the immense economy of scale by positioning a High Speed Rail Freight link from Campbelltown (Casula) to Hornsby.  

Non-Government feedback about that submission indicated that: 

  • The Northern Corridor from Sydney has a major problem between Cowan and Hawkesbury River stations. 

  • The Rail Gradient is about 1:40, which is very steep, specially for Rail Freight. 

  • Typically, three engines are required to assist hauling freight trains up this section of track.  

  • This is a massive loss of time and totally nobbles the east coast freight rail economy of scale.  

This additional submission to the Master Plan Team  resolves this very steep gradient problem with some highly Innovative Synergies to 

  • Start the rail descent just north of Berowra station, 

  • Immediately cross over the M3 Motorway and 

  • Run in a virtually straight path towards the west of the Hawkesbury River station

  • This section will have an average gradient of about 1:57 instead of 1:40.  

By implementing these Innovative Synergies, then: 

  • Extra Freight Engines would no longer be required for this section

  • Central Coast Commuter and Freight Rail transit times would be slashed

  • Road Safety would be significantly increased

  • This section together with the Sydney Basin Bypass would provide an almost straight rail connection from Campbelltown

  • The Economy of Scale of the Rail Infrastructure could be used to much of its potential

  • The high cost of Road damage caused by Road Freight would be minimised.

Preparing NSW for High Speed Rail Transport (2012)

In September 2012, the New South Wales Government released their NSW Draft Master Transport Long Term Plan 2012, which is about 350 pages long, and as said under here, is still very Roads Oriented.  

The fundamental problem with this Draft Transport Master Plan is that it is focussed on bandaging the increasing symptoms of excessive road damage, primarily caused by Road Freight vehicles.  The CAUSE of the excessive road damage is high use of Road Freight vehicles being used where Rail Infrastructure has not been economically managed and funded; and this Draft Master Plan missed out here too.  

There are no strategies in their Master Plan to prepare for High Speed Rail technology.  

Such preparations outlined in my response should have included the following Innovative Synergies:

  • Convert the Electrified Rail System to 25 kV AC to be in alignment with the developed world.  

  • Regularly Replace and Upgrade the Rail Infrastructure.  

  • Realise that the Geographic Centre of Sydney is virtually Parramatta.  

  • Treble the East Hills line to connect with Port Botany, and Central.  

  • Connect an almost straight Freight Rail from Campbelltown to Hornsby.  

  • Restructure the Rail Freight Paths in the Sydney Basin.  

  • Position an International Airport near Goulburn.  

  • Position an major Freight Interchange near Goulburn

The Draft NSW Transport Master Plan 2012 shows that road improvements since about 1975 have resulted in significant reduction in the number of fatalities!  This response showed that vehicle improvements (Variable Ratio Steering, Computer Aided Vehicle Engineering) are the prime reduction factors for reduced fatality figures since 1975 - despite more Sydney Motorways, a high percentage of road fatalities are excessive speed and fatigue associated collisions.  Road Freight management and Hoons are the major contributors to these "Darwin Awards".

 

Sydney's Missing Commuter Rail (2012)

In June 2012 the New South Wales Government released a 28-page document about Modernising Sydney's Trains, which seems to be somewhat separate to the extremely heavily Road-oriented NSW Draft Master Transport Long Term Plan 2012.    

While advances in Telecommunications (the Internet) are dramatically restructuring workplaces to be away from Sydney CBD office-centred, the Modernising Sydney's Trains document still sees Sydney CBD in 2031 as still being at least 7 times bigger than any other CBD in the Sydney Basin!   

With the understanding that Parramatta is very close to the geographic centre of the Sydney Basin, it was extremely puzzling that the future plans to Modernise Sydney's Trains, did not move the transport focus into Parramatta, but instead, left Parramatta virtually isolated.

My submission to the NSW Government 

  • Loop the end of the proposed North-West Rail back at Riverstone to form a loop

  • Loop the East Hills Line and Southern Main line as Holsworthy - Casula 

  • Change Rail Line Management to Rail Network Management

  • Really maximise the number of stations with very frequent pickup intervals 

The second part of this submission looks closer provides a sensible cost-effective engineering solution in the Rosehill area to: 

This proposal will provide the necessary rail infrastructure so that commercial businesses can relocate to the Parramatta / RosehHill area and rail commuters can transit with a minimum of station latency in all directions of this soon fast growing geographically central Sydney Basin CBD. 

This proposal did not address Sydney's Northern Peninsula missing rail network. :(

 

 

 

 

Connecting Port Botany (2012)

In response to the NSW Draft Master Transport Plan 2012 - my proposal provides a ready solution to the land-locked Port Botany Shipping Freight Terminal.   

This Heavy Transport Shipping Terminal is basically not rail connected.  

This rail-disconnected terminal the PRIME CAUSE of the immense road freight / commuter/ light commercial traffic problems in the Sydney Basin and Sydney's North and South (Road) Freight Corridors

My strategy is to properly connect Port Botany to the existing rail network by 

  • Including the second rail line from Port Botany to the south end of Mascot

  • Straighten the tight bending dual tracks in south Mascot 

  • Run an almost straight land bridge over the south end of Mascot (which is largely vacant land, parking lots, light industrial and some housing) 

The second part of my Innovative Synergy is to: 

  • Branch these Rail tracks near Qantas/Airport Drive 

  • Make a near-straight Dual Rail Bridge to join with the East Hills line near Wolli Creek

  • Branch just west of Sydney Airport, before Arncliffe station to directly link into the South Coast Line.  

The immense positives of this proposal to Connect Port Botany by a "Quick Rail Freight" infrastructure include 

  • Direct connectivity with the South Coast (via Hurstville), 

  • Direct connectivity with the Southern Corridor (via the East Hills Line), 

  • Considerably free up the M5 and Hume Highway

  • Direct connectivity with the Western Corridor via Lidcombe - Parramatta - Penrith, and 

  • Direct connectivity with the Northern Corridor (via the earlier proposed Sydney Basin Rail Link, connecting via Lidcombe - Clyde)

  • Avoid the Strathfield "U" turn and avoiding the Epping Line.  

  • Free up Pennant Hills Road and the F3 of road freight traffic.  

 

Sydney Basin Rail Link (2012)

The more recent road-based proposal to build a road tunnel highway off the southern end of the F3 Freeway connecting Sydney to the north is yet another futile and expensive attempt to "fix" Road Freight congestion in the northern end of Sydney (Hornsby / Wahroonga the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road).  

My proposal in this submission

  • Joins three rather under-utilised heavy rail track sections with  two almost straight 4 km tunnels

  • Free-up the Enfield / Strathfield - Auburn Network and Switch congestion

  • Creates an almost straight path rail freeway across the Sydney basin between Campbelltown to Hornsby  

  • Takes less than 25 minutes to traverse this 37 km of Rail track between Casula and Hornsby 

  • Opens the Australian east coast for relatively high speed "Quick Freight Rail" facilities.  

  • De-congests Pennant Hills Road, the F3, the and the Pacific Highway of long distance road freight vehicles.  

  • De-congests the Pacific and Hume Highways of long distance road freight vehicles.  

  • Provides the missing link rail commuter "Outer Northern" loop Hornsby - Pennant Hills - Carlingford - Telopea - Dundas - Rose Hill - Clyde - Lidcombe - Strathfield - Central - North Sydney - St Leonard's - Chatswood - Gordon - Hornsby.  

  • De-congests Epping station so that the recently approved North-West Rail Link can comfortably connect with Epping station from Strathfield and from Chatswood.   

 

Inquiry into the Digital Dividend (2010)

The louder the Telecomms Radio lobby shouts, the more obvious that there is insufficient Geographically isolated  Radio Spectrum to provide Broadband / Internet  Access to Mobile devices - so the Green Paper (financial)  "Digital Dividend" is all about re-allocating already allocated TV channels in the UHF range then to auction these off as Broadband Internet channels to .  

Not only are these channel spacings internationally non-standard, but the planned groupings do not make optimum use of these stolen UHF TV Channels!  This Submission explains: 

  • Why the Australian TV Channels are internationally non-standard,

  • How to very inexpensively bring Australia back to 8 MHz spacings as per the ITU.

  • How to use the UHF Spectrum for some more Broadband / Internet Access to Mobile devices

  • Why Competitive Wireless (Mobile) Access is highly inefficient and very wasteful.

  • Why Spectrum Auctions are Fundamentally Economically Flawed

The term "Digital Dividend" is snake-oil speak for "re-allocation of spectrum resources" as this spectrum space is very scarce. 

Note: The spectrum bands covered in this paper is not Wi-Fi  

 

 

 

Implementation of the NBN (2010)

It is now May 2010 and the Federal Government is again seeking comments.  Unfortunately the Government did not utilise the expertise within the NBN Co but went to yet another consulting group and received yet another response that seriously lacked telecommunications engineering expertise together with in-house Australian experience.  

This submission seriously questions the philosophy of the consultants telecomms knowledge and expertise

This submission again shows:

  • Why Privatised Infrastructures simply do not function in less than High Value / High Demand areas

  • Where the Telecomms Backhaul Infrastructure in Australia is Outdated and/or missing

  • Why ADSL cannot work outside metro areas, and why Remote (DSL) will fail. 

  • How and where considerable Backhaul infrastructure needs to be positioned (before the NBN can really be rolled out)  

  • Where the necessary Backhaul Infrastructure needs to be 

  • How much this Backhaul Infrastructure would cost to Install and Commission 

  • Why the NBN cannot Roll Out where there is no Backhaul connectivity with sufficient throughput 

  • Why Australia is seriously lacking in Technical Staff that can use Optical Fibre

  • Why it will take several years to roll out the NBN

  • Where to build a inland High Capacity Backbones

  • How to split Telstra into Bigpond and Telstra, and then spin off Bigpond as the privatised body

  • How to merge NBN into Telstra as a sub-Government Commission

Appendix 7 in this submission carry into several topics that were covered in Questions by Senators:  Senator Ian MacDonald (QLD) asked a supposedly rhetorical question about providing Broadband to Birdsville.  My answer then and now provides a temporary solution for Broadband to Birdsville (and the area between Emerald to Longreach - to Birdsville) for less than $5M.  Senator Nick Minchin (SA), questioned the Infrastructure Regime (like most educated people he had been selectively not educated past the Competitive Regime), and his questions about the lack of Trained Staff were spot on!   

Appendix 9 provides initial estimates of the necessary Backhaul infrastructure that needs to be in place and working well before the NBN can be rolled out into these areas.

 

National Freight Network Plan (2010)

In February 2010 Infrastructure Australia asked for submissionsMy submission showed how the Oil Industry Lobby (OIL) has infiltrated the Governments in Australia and deceitfully removed tram / rail transport wherever possible and replaced it with road vehicles.  

The Appendix also explains why Road Transport has a carbon footprint that is about 600% greater then the equivalent Rail Freight transport.  

There are several missing links that are identified and these include:

  • Freight Specific Sydney - Brisbane (dual tracks)

  • Melbourne - Brisbane (Dual tracks, inland and freight specific)

  • Narrabri - Maitland (bypassing Newcastle) - Sydney

  • Western Sydney Bypass (Campbelltown - Hornsby)

  • Melbourne - Swan Hill - Port Augusta (inland bypass of the coastal route)

  • Melbourne - Bairnsdale - Eden - Bombaderry - Sydney

  • Yass - Canberra spur (link to Goulburn)

  • Tennant Creek - Mt Isa (links Queensland to Darwin)

This missing infrastructure is necessary to advance Australia from the very high cost of liquid fuels and dangerous transport conditions involving Road Freight.  

Rail Freight at 250 km/h is very practical almost everywhere in Australia and Rail Freight is and very cost effective in Australia.

 

NSW Government: Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Communities (2010)

By September 2010 the New South Wales Government decided to really waste money and support through stupidity in setting up a Legislative Committee to find out how bad the telecommunications facilities are in non-metropolitan areas!  This brief submission made it very clear that telecommunications is a Federal Government issue and not a New South Wales Government issue.   

 

Using the NBN and the USO as Brothers in Arms (2010)

In November 2010, the Federal Government's DICED produced a Discussion Paper relating some of the funding of the NBN with the funds that pass through the USO.  This "Captain Obvious" conclusion begged for a Submission from me that shows how this funding should be channelled and how not to get into this same financially privatised mess again.  

 

Best Public Service (2009)

In September 2009 one of the biggest challenges came out from the Advisory Group on Reform of Australian Government Administration with a discussion paper to build the World's best Public Service.  The submission provided here had a direct business attitude to perform real Performance Development Reviews and instigate the use of the "Departure Lounge" as a prelude to dismissal for poor work performance.  This Submission went through to the keeper as that Department could not face the cold hard facts!

 

Energy Efficient Homes Package (2009)

In October 2009, this submission from me showed very clearly that by using Website technology then the whole debacle about unregistered tradies and slick business people could have been easily avoided. This submission also explains the folly of ISO9002 Accreditation and why it does not work, why glass wool batts are a very partial answer, why black tiles are an energy disaster in Australia, exposes the "Clean Coal" myth, and shows that wall shading is totally overlooked in favour of poor building practices.  This submission also shows how the NBN could be used to dramatically minimise Australia's carbon footprint. 

 

Inquiry into the 
National Broadband Network II (2009)

By January 2009, the Expert Panel had realised that the FTTN structure for Broadband was a short-stop gap technology that was inappropriate for Australia. In July 2009 a Senate Select Committee was in yet another round of Inquiries to find out how to go about putting in an appropriate NBN infrastructure.  As the Expert Committee did not seem to respond to my earlier submission to them on how to go about the build, I produced yet another submission to the Select Senate Committee and had a fair hearing. 

Inquiry into the 
National Broadband Network (2008)

In January 2008 a telecommunications Expert Panel was formed to Inquire into the development of a National Broadband Network.  As I had my doubts into the expertise of this panel, I produced a submission that was very comprehensive in that it showed the technological and economic flaws of the present situation, and it showed a vision on how to get out of the pitfalls that had created this situation.  Although most official records of this panel have been scrapped, my submission still stands!  

Inquiry into the 
Regional Telecommunications Review (2007)

In late 2007, yet another Discussion Paper came out, this time about the Regional Telecommunications Review, as a result of an amendment to an Act in 2005 to Establish the Regional Telecommunications Independent Review Committee (RTIRC) - to review the adequacy of telecommunications services in Regional, Rural, and Remote parts of Australia, chaired by Dr Bill Glasson.  

Inquiry into the Australian 
Telecommunications Regulatory Regime

Truly, they walk amongst us!  When you have a situation where you need to have heavy-handed regulation in a competitive economic environment, then surely there is something very wrong with the way that the competitive environment is structured.  So it is not a case of increasing the regulation capabilities to manage irregularities in the economic competition regime, but a case of changing the economic competitive structure so that the needs for regulation requirements are minimised!  

Inquiry into the Proposed ACMA (2005)

The Australian Communications and Media Authority Bill (the ACMA Bill) addresses two existing authorities; the Australian Communications Authority (ACA) and the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA), with the direction to merge these two and form one authority called the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) by 1 July 2005. It appears that the given reason for this merge is to better manage commercial business initiatives that would otherwise fall between these two existing authorities rendering both regulatory authorities ineffective and/or irrelevant.

Inquiry into 
Broadband Competition (2003)

2003 was a very busy year with yet another Select Senate Committee Inquiry into Broadband Competition, and this was brought about because many small Broadband players were trying to get into the market.  These small players had a minimal knowledge about the Australian Telecommunications Regime and they were extremely frustrated about all the regulations that they (and the main players) had to manoeuvre to get their infrastructure in place.  The real 'argument' of this inquiry was for 'cowboy operators' to find a way around the regulations that had been put in place to prevent 'cowboy operators' competition behaviour.  It didn't work!!

Demand Aggregation 
Broker Program (2003)

In 2003, the Australian Federal Government as a follow on from Recommendation 19 of the Official Report into the Inquiry into the Australian Telecommunications Network recommended that Brokers be introduced to develop incentives for increased competitive infrastructure.  In my opinion as a Professional Telecommunications Engineer, such a program is severely flawed for many reasons.  

Coordinated Communications 
Infrastructure Fund (2003)

In 2003, the Australian Federal Government as a follow on from Recommendation 19 of the Official Report into the Inquiry into the Australian Telecommunications Network recommended that a coordinated approach be applied to arrange for communications infrastructure to be purchased, installed and commissioned into Australia.  To all but the most cynical this would seem as an excellent idea, considering that the Federal Government already had Telecom Australia doing just that, but the Federal Government had also put a financial business focus onto Telecom Australia - so the very areas that commercially would never make returns were the same areas that were desperately short of infrastructure.  

Higher Bandwidth 
Incentive Scheme (2003)

In 2003, the Australian Federal Government as a follow on from Recommendation 19 of the Official Report into the Inquiry into the Australian Telecommunications Network recommended that non-metropolitan geographic business areas need to be identified so that they can get together and as a group use the one Broadband service and from jointly using that Broadband service, they may then find business needs that then would require the services of a Broadband Broker to negotiate more Broadband equipment!  Considering that the Federal Government already had Telecom Australia and Optus doing just that, but the Federal Government had also put a financial business focus onto Telecom Australia (and Optus) - so the very areas that commercially would never make returns were the same areas that were desperately short of infrastructure.  

Inquiry into Regional and Remote Network Capacity (2002)

Here is that Report!!

Inquiry into the Australian 
Telecommunications Network (2002)

In 2002 through to 2004, it again became obvious that the Australian Federal Government's Department had again lost the plot and another inquiry was initiated by the  Minister for Telecommunications, Information Technology and the Arts (Senator the Hon Richard Alston), and this media release includes the Terms of Reference for the Inquiry into the Australian Telecommunications Network.  This was chaired by Mr Richard Estens and the report eventually channelled large sums of funding into non-metropolitan areas to prop up telecommunications services that were never going to be financially justifiable in a commercial business sense, and the process of funding was, in my opinion, the most business inefficient method possible - and it failed to deliver!

National Bandwidth Inquiry (1998)

In 1998 Senator Richard Alston initiated yet another inquiry regarding telecommunications in Australia, this time it was to enquire about the availability of National Bandwidth in the telecommunications industry, and waste more time and money making yet another useless report on the situation instead of directly funding Engineers to fix the problem caused by privatisation. 

 

Networking the Nation (1997)

In June 1997, the Australian Federal Government established a seriously fractionated infrastructure programme called Networking the Nation (NTN).  This was a brilliant conception in that if anybody had a complaint about the telecommunications service that they had, then it was up to them to form a Committee and that committee was to then do all the groundwork and produce a Business Case to be forwarded to the Department of Telecommunications, Information Technology and the Arts and the requests for infrastructure build would then the tendered by that Department to have the works scheduled.  If the problems are not obvious then the submission that I provided would have highlighted to the most inept that this process flooded everywhere with procedural flaws.  

The Davidson Report (1982)

The Davidson Report was a definitive document that changed the telecommunications landscape from an economically efficient government business, into a business efficient privatised business, and the timing of this change coincided with massive savings in overheads due to the introduction of digital technologies into the telecommunications industries worldwide.  With this knowledge about the digital technology revolution, it really begs the question if the commercial changes brought in by the Davidson Report actually were worth the effort for the customers - or for shareholders; or for anybody in Australia.  

An insight into the Political and Economic Background of the Australian Infrastructure and in particular Australia's  Telecommunications Industry

A long, long time ago in a country far, far away - there was an Australian Federal Government Department of Transport and Communications that had within it the Post Master General's Department that provided infrastructure services for telecommunication, postal services, the Australian Broadcasting Commission, providing infrastructure services for Radio and Television Broadcasting, and the Department of Transport, providing infrastructure services for the road and rail transport.  This was a brilliant conception of synergetic efficiency as all these infrastructure components had within them transport as their common synergetic thread. 

In the early 1970s, in another country not so far away, the then Chilean Government realised that their national telecommunications costs were very expensive and that they were being ripped off by the International Telegraph and Telephone cooperation as ITT which owned about 70% of Chitelco, the Chilean Telephone Company.  The Chilean Government moved to nationalise this company and bring the operations on as a Government Infrastructure business.   

In similar dimensions as Darth Vader (Star Wars), the USA-based Capitalists (Industrialists and Bankers) were horrified that a comparatively small country like Chile would move to Nationalise what these Capitalists had plundered.  The Capitalists then manipulated USA President Nixon / Government and the CIA to ensure that the then Socialist Government of Chile would be smashed, with General Pinnochet being installed in 1973 as the puppet leader for the CIA.  As far as I can tell the Chilean Telecomms industry was never nationalised, but the country was driven to bankruptcy by the CIA under Nixon's orders.  

The aftermath of this sojourn was that the USA sent out a very clear and divisive message that all countries that wished to be aligned with the (non-communist) Western world, had better start selling off their infrastructures to private concerns as a very high priority or face the wrath similar to that metered out to Chile. 

As Australia is frogmarched by the USA under the ANZUS Treaty; successive Australian Federal and State Governments continue to flog off valuable taxpayer-earned infrastructure businesses to multi-national conglomerates, equity groups and large businesses with gay abandon.  Further, these Governments stupidly facilitate the creation of extremely expensive privatised infrastructure businesses set up in competition with the incumbent government infrastructure business.  

The natural process is that these privatised infrastructure businesses quickly lose their planning expertise and preventative maintenance standards, while having extremely overpaid and inept Executives run these uncompetitive privatised infrastructure businesses into bankruptcy.  At this point the government of the day then has to buy back the infrastructure at an exorbitant expense and the cycle starts all over again.  The buyback of the New Zealand Railway is a typical example. 

The Post Master General's Department was one of Australia' early casualties with it being "split up" to be more "competitive", and later in 1980/1982, the Davidson Report was compiled by three people that had a very limited knowledge about Telecommunications and in particular Telecommunications in Australia.  Optus was set up as a competitive privatised infrastructure business and as a consequence of this stupidity, neither Telstra nor Optus have any substantial telecommunications infrastructure outside the major capital cities in Australia, capable of providing Quality Broadband services outside the capital cities.  

In the past 20 years there have been several very ill-conceived attempts (see above) to introduce competition to create the necessary inland telecommunications infrastructure, and all these pro-competition strategies have naturally failed.  Recently a Federal Government realised that of forcing  competition into infrastructure is the problem and have set to have the now missing telecommunications infrastructure built to bring Australian telecommunications infrastructure into line with what is required.  

Those bemoaning the NBN rollout just don't "get it"!  

Copyright Malcolm Moore, 1980-2012.   Comments and Corrections are welcome